How is this man still alive?

I was one of the first to cast doubts on what kind of grip on power — if any — Kim Jong-un would have in North Korea once his father kicked the bucket. In the past I have referred to him as The Kim Who Wasn't There, suggesting that whatever coronation the Western media (including South Korea and Japan) were bestowing on him was premature: his power was inchoate and his ascension was cosmetic if not wholly imaginary.

In the wake of his father's death, his sudden rise and ubiquity in North Korean media smells to me like a scramble to put him in place for the sake of continuity, a quickie act of convenience for everyone involved, but I would bet dollars to malasadas that whatever faction is supporting him has a tenuous hold at best. The Incas may well have been talking about the Kim Dynasty when they had their calendar ending in 2012.

Um, anyway, the reason for this post, other than to sum up the current evolution of my Nork Dynasty Denial, is that Kim Jongun's hyŏng Kim Jongnam seems to agree with me.

From the Christian Science Monitor, which is not Christian, not science, nor any kind of lizard:

Kim’s oldest brother, Kim Jong-Nam, living in the gambling enclave of Macao on the southeastern coast of China, hinted at the lack of confidence behind the campaign to glorify the new leader, according to a Japanese newspaper.

Rejected by his father as a successor more than 10 years ago, Kim Jong-nam reportedly talked about the buildup of his brother while expressing misgivings. Mr. Kim reportedly told the Tokyo Shimbun in an e-mail that he expected “the existing ruling elite to follow in the footsteps of my father while keeping the young successor as a symbolic figure."

It was “difficult,” he was quoted as saying in a burst of frankness that he has displayed in earlier encounters with the Japanese media, “to accept a third-generation succession under normal reasoning."

Kim Jong-nam was quoted in a newly published book by Japanese journalist Yoji Gomi as having been still more critical. In the book, entitled "My father Kim Jong-Il and Me," he said, "North Korea is very unstable" and "the power of the military has become too strong." Jong-nam, communicating in Korean by e-mail and in interviews with Mr. Gomi last year, is quoted as saying, "If the succession ends in failure, the military will wield the real power for sure."

That perspective from a close but clearly disillusioned relative jibes with the views of foreign analysts who wonder how long Kim Jong-un can last – or whether he can possibly take charge of his own destiny and that of his people.

Funny how "the views of foreign analysts" are only now catching up with what I'd been saying on this blog back in 2010 (and yeah, I know that some of them were reading it, too).

Anyway, Kim Jongnam must have cojones the size of beach balls, because he seems unable to resist poking the Pyongyang power elite in the eye. I hope the guy stays out of trouble, because I see a role for him in the future as either (a) an adviser to his little brother who may really want to change things in the DPRK or (b) a pragmatic figure who can step in and be a bridge from the past to the future if things start getting unstable. Call me a perpetual optimist.

...

Unification Minister seeing the light about The Kim Who Wasn't There™?

AFP is quoting a Yonhap article suggesting that even ROK Unification Minister Yu Woo-ik (the Tim Conway lookalike above) is having doubts that the ascension of North Korean strongman Kim Jong-il's son, Kim Jong-un, to a done deal.

From AFP:

North Korean leader Kim Jong-Il faces challenges in transferring power to his youngest son, according to South Korea's top official on cross-border affairs.

"I assume that the power succession is under way, though the internal and external environment is not that good," Unification Minister Yu Woo-Ik told Yonhap news agency in an interview published Sunday.

Kim, 69, is believed to have speeded up the succession plan after suffering a stroke in August 2008.

In September last year he gave his youngest son Jong-Un senior party posts and appointed him a four-star general, in the clearest sign yet that he is the heir apparent.

Yu, whose comments were confirmed by his ministry, told Yonhap in the interview conducted Friday that the leader is healthy enough to perform his job.

He did not elaborate on Kim's health or what he meant by an unfavourable environment for the succession.

It is unclear whether the untested Jong-Un, in his late 20s, faces political opposition to what would be the second dynastic succession. Kim senior took power when his own father Kim Il-Sung died in 1994.

I, of course, have been saying this all along, but here and there I notice that others are jumping on the bandwagon.

...

Picture of the day: Who's who at the North Korea anniversary party

I clicked on this link which the Washington Post had described thus:

North Korean leader Kim Jong Il and his son watched a massive military parade in Pyongyang on Friday, to mark the 63rd anniversary of the country's founding.

One would expect from such a caption that those two — and perhaps only those two — watching the parade way up their on the dais, were positioned in a way that it was truly a sign that the Young General had taken his place of honor at the Right Hand as the Rightful Heir of the Dear Leader.

Yet we see, yet again, that The Kim Who Wasn't There™ doesn't even get to stand next to his dad. Nope, the Ascension of Kim Jong-un is by no means a done deal, even if the WaPo and the Associated are hanging on that prospect. For now, the would-be Radiant Leader is merely the Dreary Wallflower.

Perhaps I need to go do a KCNA check once again and see if Kim Jong-un is still mentioned so little that he is essentially off the radar.

...

Kim Jong-un's "Tora! Tora! Tora!" moment?*

The Chosun Ilbo would have us believe that Kim Jong-un, the young general who supposedly is poised to take over for Dad when he kicks the bucket, is the one who ordered the attacks on South Korea over the past year:

A North Korean document supports the conclusion that North Korea attacked the Navy corvette Cheonan and Yeonpyeong Island last year to whip up domestic support for the succession of leader Kim Jong-il’s son, Jong-un.

The document, which the Chosun Ilbo obtained from a source in China on Tuesday, claims that Kim junior was deeply involved in both attacks. Titled “Lecture Materials,” the document was apparently drawn up for military propaganda officers early this year.

According to its wording, Kim Jong-un told military leaders that the inter-Korean situation “will become very tense in February and March.” He made the comments around the end of January last year, two months before the attack on the Cheonan. The document claims South Korea and the U.S. “concocted a plot about the sinking of the Cheonan, but it failed.”

The source, who claims to do frequent business with trading companies under the North Korean Workers Party, said that propaganda officers have been indoctrinating North Korean soldiers to show absolute loyalty to Kim Jong-un based on those materials. “They even have to take a test after their indoctrination classes,” he said.

As I noted at ROK Drop, I'm a bit curious about the date. The “2010년 1월” stands out as odd when one sees that in North Korean news sources the “Western” date is typically hand in hand with the 주체 date (주체 99년 or some such). I wonder if anybody who has familiarity with actual North Korean documents could provide insight about whether the above is a reason to find this document suspect.

Of course, dear reader, you may already be aware that I am deeply suspicious of the mountain of evidence, eagerly printed up in the Chosun Ilbo and repeated uncritically in the Japanese and Western press, that comes from what could be described as an Evidence Mill™ run by people who make money and/or enhance their stature from supplying this stuff. While I think most defectors/refugees are genuine people who can give us valuable insight into current attitudes in the regime, it seems to me that a handful of folks might be looking for personal gain à la that Iraqi guy who supplied all of the information used back in 2002 and 2003 to justify going to war against Saddam Hussein.

Of course, from Kim Jong-il not being at death's door, to Ling and Lee having willingly entered North Korea, to Kim Jong-un's coronation not being imminent, my views on North Korea have others viewing me at first as crankily contrarian and out of touch and then later as eerily prescient.

But that doesn't mean I could be wrong on this. Always my caveat.

* And yeah, I know that "Tora! Tora! Tora!" is Japanese. My theory is that a Korean pilot in the Imperial Japanese Navy on that fateful day in December 1941 had a bit of prescience himself and had gotten on the radio to warn everybody to turn around. 

Associated Press bureau... in Pyongyang?!

That's what AP is reporting, and I guess they'd be the ones that'd know.

From AP via WaPo:

A memorandum of understanding agreed by the AP and the Korean Central News Agency would expand the AP’s presence in North Korea to a level unmatched by any other Western news organization. It would build upon the AP’s existing video news bureau, which opened in Pyongyang in 2006, by allowing AP text and photo journalists to work in North Korea as well.

With the signing, the agencies agreed to begin work immediately on detailed planning needed to set up and operate the new bureau as quickly as possible. It would be the first permanent text and photo bureau operated by a Western news organization in the North Korean capital.

In addition, the agencies signed a contract designating the AP as the exclusive international distributor of contemporary and historic video from KCNA’s archive. The agencies also plan a joint photo exhibition in New York next year. They already had an agreement between them to distribute KCNA photo archives to the global market, signed earlier this year.

Wow. That is truly historic. That is, if it actually comes to pass. There are a lot of rest stops between Point MOU and Point B when it comes to North Korea. The DRPK government may easily decide there's a huge difference between fluff videos of people visiting Kim Ilsung statues, which they started to allow in 2006, and day-to-day reporting on the good and the bad, which is presumably what AP has in mind.

But imagine it does go ahead. This is AP reporting form Pyongyang. And while we all know that the North Korean capital is a showcase for foreign eyes, the Pyongyang regime can't control everything, nor are they wholly effective when it comes to keeping the contagion of foreign ideas in check.

What we might end up actually seeing is the North Korean government actually trying to be on better behavior when things go wrong (and it's not a stretch that they could). Right now we've been seeing the Jasmine Revolution spreading through the Arab world, and at least one thing preventing some of those governments from just mowing down all the protesters (this includes Iran last year, though Iran is not part of the Arab world) has been the international press.

Call me optimistic, but this makes a violent, bloody end to the regime less likely (though still well within the realm of possibility). It makes the future leader of North Korea, be that a ruling junta or The Kim Who Wasn't There, more likely to consider how everything looks to the outside world when taking power, maintaining order, and dealing with the hoi polloi.

Historic, truly historic. If it happens.

Kerry says engage North Korea directly

Writing in an oped piece that appeared in the Los Angeles Times, former Democratic presidential nominee and current US Senator from Massachusetts John Kerry says that the Obama administration's stance has been measured, firm, but ultimately inadequate. He calls for direct talks:

Returning immediately to the six-party talks (which included North Korea, South Korea, the United States, Russia, China and Japan) is not viable. South Korea won't participate unless North Korea atones for its recent bad behavior. And the North, approaching a leadership succession in 2012, is disinclined to cooperate lest it look weak.

Similarly, there are limits to the pressure that China is willing and able to apply. China exerts the most leverage as North Korea's ally and largest trading partner, but it's not willing to risk the country's collapse. Further, Pyongyang has a habit of stubbornly resisting good advice, even from its patrons in Beijing.

The best alternative is for the United States to engage North Korea directly.

We all have grown weary of North Korea's truculence — its habit of ratcheting up tensions, followed by calls to negotiate back from the brink, followed by concessions, and a repetition of the process. But while North Korea may be the "land of lousy options," as one expert calls it, inaction only invites a dangerous situation to get worse.

While he accepts the label of North Korea as "the land of lousy options," I say, pragmatically, nothing can be done about North Korea, not without China's consent. And frankly, I think Senator Kerry misreads and misunderstands the degree and extent of China's influence.

China may already be taking last year's attacks and using them as a pretext for changing Pyongyang's behavior at a holistic level. China does not want to lose their buffer, of course, and they also want access to the East Sea (aka Sea of Japan), and they have belatedly realized how bad it is for Beijing to ignore Pyongyang's bad behavior.

Note that all of this has little to do with what Seoul, Washington, or Tokyo have done. When Seoul takes a hardline stance on Pyongyang, as current President Lee Myungbak has done, North Korea sinks South Korean ships and shells South Korean islands, but even when South Korea was on the complete opposite course, in the heady days of Sunshine Policy openness, there were major military clashes out in the Yellow Sea.

And thus Kerry misjudges the situation, saying a dangerous situation will get worse if we do nothing, when in fact it is our predictable "gotta do something" response that precipitates the next round of brinkmanship by North Korea. Pyongyang thinks it has a winning formula, which is why (as I colorfully illustrated here, where I noted that Kim Jong-il acts like a six-year-old Kushibo) we need to break that cycle.

President Obama has been firm and his response measured because he is not reacting as his predecessors did. Certainly he has the benefit of foresight that Clinton and even Bush43 did not, and he so far seems to be sticking to what Joshua Stanton of One Free Korea calls "Plan B," a hard-nosed, non-military threat that hurts the Pyongyang regime financially to effect changes in their behavior.

Now where Joshua and I may disagree is that I think it was necessary to at least try Sunshine Policy, given that a hardline policy had been ineffective for the nearly half century prior to that, and I think even though Sunshine Policy failed (in part for being too much carrot and not enough stick) engagement should be tried in ways that will not benefit the DPRK military or line the coffers of the regime (see previous link). But we both agree that Obama should stick to this plan. To engage now would just reward Kim Jong-il's government for patiently waiting for anger to subside just enough that Washington and Seoul will come to the table, making such bad acts more likely in the future when Pyongyang isn't getting its way again.

It also comes at a time when Beijing may actually be effecting real changes, for a change. Although I am deeply concerned that China's ultimate goal may be to fully integrate North Korea into its Northeastern Provinces (making North Korea the Inner Cháoxiān Autonomous Region), China has started to leverage its role as North Korea's only friend of substance, forcing Pyongyang to make economic reforms, helped along by China in exchange for small territorial concessions.

But that largely gets ignored. While I've been beating the drum that China has begun this reform-and-absorb policy in earnest, the rest of the world was distracted by the Kim Jong-un ascension side show.

My conclusion is that people like Senator Kerry should visit Monster Island and One Free Korea a bit more often, because then you might see that Pyongyang is still trying to play you, but Obama seems to have picked up on that.

If any negotiations should be done with North Korea at this time, it should be to decide which plot of land in Mongolia the Royal Kimenbaums would like for their exile.

Requisite picture of threatening-looking images from 
North Korea that must accompany any article on North Korea. 
In this photo: North Korean MILDs (military I'd like to disarm).

Western North Korea experts don't trust South Korean media on North Korea?

The Marmot highlights a very interesting English-language piece in the Kyunghyang Shinmun about how Westerner North Korea watchers (or American ones, at least) generally discount the truthiness of South Korean reports on North Korea:

Though I hate to admit it, among the so-called "Korea watchers" around Washington, who take interest in and observe issues on the Korean Peninsula, trust in the South Korean media is almost at rock bottom.

Since hardly anything that goes on inside North Korea is made public, not many articles are written based on clear facts. The result is a large number of articles that make deductions based on phenomena visible from the outside. In many cases, however, the grounds for such deductions are weak too.

I have to admit that this North Korea watcher (i.e., me) often dismisses or questions South Korean media reports about North Korea as speculative and based on flimsy evidence, but I say the exact same thing about Western (and Japanese) media reports on North Korea. In fact, you could say I've been making a career of this lately, what with me questioning the whole bandwagon thing of Kim Jong-un being so obviously elevated to leadership and deriding the media in general for ignoring the real story of China slowly but steadily and surely absorbing North Korea (i.e., "the Manchurianization of North Korea").

Anyway, the Marmot's post is an interesting read, and it linked to something from 2009, Mr Cullen Thomas, the author of Brother One Cell who managed to get himself arrested in South Korea for mailing himself hashish from the Philippines, going online and on air to discuss how his own drug-related legal problems in South Korea in 1994 were kinda sorta maybe just like Laura Ling's and Euna Lee's in North Korea fifteen years later.

I must have been traveling from Seoul back to California or Hawaii when this post was up, because it seems I completely missed both The Marmot's post and this gem where Joshua of One Free Korea fisks it.

Setting aside what an idiot Mr Thomas was and how he's trying to milk that for all it's worth, what annoys me about his appearance on CNN is the way they conflate South Korea and North Korea. Right off the bat, in CNN's introduction to Mr Thomas's appearance, I knew it would be unworthy of my time.

I loathe the journalistic media's laziness, both intellectual and structural.

While it's true that Mr Thomas makes a valid point that apology is a way for courts in South Korea to provide leniency (something that he did not do, by the way), this is something that could be gleaned from just about any North Korea watcher or Korea expert (see my "Who is Kushibo?" bio to see if I qualify) by reading their blog.

There's an analogy in there somewhere. 

Educating Leader (UPDATED)

UPDATE 1:
Although the WaPo had also reported that Kim Jong-un is the one in China, AP is now saying that it might actually be Kim Jong-il himself (Yonhap has the story here). This doesn't change my theory below: China is acquiescing to preservation of the dynasty only if North Korea goes along with China's plans and ideas, and Beijing will be pushing to make sure Kim Jong-un understands what is expected.

UPDATE 2:
Here is the latest from Yonhap and the LAT. They are saying the original reports had it backwards and it is now kinda sorta confirmed that Kim Jong-il is in China, while they're still wondering if Boy Wonder is with him. Note that the the LAT's picture (shown below) is of the North Korean embassy in Beijing even though the reports indicate that the Dear Leader and/or his son are in the part of China much closer to the DPRK. Very confusing (not to mention sloppy), and I don't understand why they do things like that.

The media, which is largely failing to grasp the on-going story about China's Manchurianization of North Korea, is speculating that this trip "might be a request for food and economic aid," so they are assuming the final destination will be Beijing (and it indeed could be). The LAT's Barbara Demick does seem to have some inkling of what's going on, with her mention of the de facto Chinese takeover of a North Korean island in the Yalu River.

Regarding the confusion of Who's On First right now, the initial reports were not entirely wrong, as they were half right in saying that "it remains to be seen whether he was traveling alone or together with Kim Jong-il," and it turns out KJI is there and KJU himself might be there.

Actually, if L'il L'il Kim is not with Daddy Dearest, it would appear Beijing is less eager to groom Kim Jong-un, which strengthens my theory all along that KJU is being treated by China as The Kim Who Wasn't There and that they are only reluctantly going along with any inkling of a succession only in exchange for major concessions on reform and "minor" concessions on territorial control (see below). And the fact that either one of the Kims is in Northeast China strengthens that overall theory as well.

Just read this below and follow the links and it will all make sense.

This is the LAT's photo for the KJI-in-China story. It's a paramilitary police officer at the North Korean embassy in Beijing, opening a gate for a diplomatic car. Even though KJI is not in Beijing, this is the go-to spot for a photo for the story, which only confuses the reader. KJI is, if reports are correct, not in Beijing but in China's northeastern provinces. This is key because it is those provinces that Beijing is pushing to have North Korea integrated with. It is those provinces' economic reforms that Beijing is modeling for Pyongyang. By the way, I have visited this embassy, back in college. I talked with some North Korean diplomats inside. Nice people, or so it seemed. 

ORIGINAL POST:
Yonhap is reporting that heir-inapparent Kim Jong-un is in China.

From Yonhap:

North Korean leader Kim Jong-il's heir apparent son, Kim Jong-un, has been confirmed to be visiting China, a source in a Chinese border city said Friday.

The junior Kim arrived in Tumen, in the northeastern Chinese province of Jilin, early Friday morning, but his next destination has yet to be confirmed, the source in Tumen told Yonhap News Agency. The source asked not to be identified, citing the issue's sensitivity.

Security has been tightened considerably in Tumen and areas linking the Chinese city with North Korean border, the source added.

A ranking government official in Seoul said that the North's presumed heir may have certainly arrived in China considering circumstances observed so far, noting he is unlikely to travel to Beijing.

When Beijing summons the leader of its vassal state, it can only mean one thing. The problem is, we usually have to guess at what that one thing is.

The press will likely fall over itself showing how it is yet further evidence that the Young General is solidifying his role as next leader of North Korea...

The trip is widely seen as China's seal of approval for what would mark the communist regime's second hereditary power succession.

... but I, on the other hand, am a bit more skeptical.

As those of you who travel in the alternate universe of Monster Island* know, China is leveraging its tentative support for the Kim Dynasty as a way of solidifying its control over North Korea and its plans to integrate it into China's Northeastern Provinces, what I call the Manchurianization of North Korea.

We've already seen Chinese troops moving into the free-trade zone port of Rajin/Rasŏn to secure a Chinese-controlled outlet on the Sea of Japan. And we are likely witnessing Beijing allowing dynastic rule to continue as long as the Pyongyang regime makes economic reforms, including researching socialism-with Chinese characteristics as well as plain old capitalism.

In exchange for Beijing's continued support, the Pyongyang regime is also being forced to give political and geographic concessions that allow China to meld the future Inner Cháoxiān Autonomous Region with the provinces of Jilin, Liaoning, and Heilongjiang.

And thus it's notable that Kim Jong-un is not headed for Beijing but is instead going no farther than the provinces just beyond the river. No doubt this trip by the younger Kim is meant as a means to educate the future king. We've seen this before and we should expect to see it more and more.

So, in conclusion, it is not a seal of approval. It's driver's ed.

*actually a peninsula

After anti-climactic meet-up in Pyongyang, Kim Jong-un is still The Kim Who Wasn't There

These protesters are opposed to Kim Jong-un sporting a tilaka.
Such a third eye would give him incredible insight and power.

It was supposed to be the big one, following the other big one.

While the grand meeting of the DPRK's Korean Workers' Party last fall was supposed to see Kim Jong-un, Dear Leader Kim Jong-il's third son, anointed the next leader of North Korea, what we saw instead was KJU promoted to four-star general (even though he'd never served in the military) and made co-chairman of the powerful military commission. We finally saw his face but there was no coronation or even official acknowledgement to the North Korean people that this "also in attendance" Kim Jong-un was the son of their leader.

But just you wait until next time, we were told. Back in the fall it was too early for both his coming-out party and his consecration as the next leader. Come spring, when they meet again, his ascension will be complete. Just you wait.

Indeed, early this week we had a number of media outlets talking up how this next meeting will see Kim Jong-un officially named successor:

The North Korean leadership will meet on Thursday as reports surface that Kim Jong-Il might be handing his son a powerful government position, according to the Yonhap news agency from South Korea.

Donald Kirk at Asia Times even reported on reports of pre-succession purges:

Word from a cast of sources, official, unofficial, from defectors and others with occasional contacts into the North over Chinese cell phone systems, is that the Kim dynasty is getting rid of anyone who looks vaguely suspicious of the succession process.

Dear Leader Kim Jong-il, now accompanied almost all the time on visits to factories and military units by third son and heir presumptive Kim Jong-eun, is said to be hastening the purge in the run-up to 2012. That's when Kim, father and son, celebrate the 100th anniversary of the birth, on April 15, 1912, of the founder of the dynasty, Great Leader Kim Il-sung.

Analysts here see a parallel between the current purge and that conducted by Kim Jong-il after his father's death on July 8, 1994. "They executed people when Kim Jong-il took over," said an academic contact here. "They always have to conduct a purge when there's a change in power."

But like so much of the news about The Kim Who Wasn't There, this turned out to be a whole lot of nothing:

North Korean leader Kim Jong Il’s youngest son and heir-apparent wasn’t mentioned in a list of new Cabinet members today, signaling that the dynastic transfer of power isn’t likely to happen soon.

Kim Jong Un, thought to be in his late 20s, was given his first posts within the ruling Workers’ Party in September, paving the way to become North Korea’s next leader. His name didn’t feature, though, in government appointments approved at a parliamentary meeting, according to the state-run Korean Central News Agency. The Supreme People’s Assembly did agree on next year’s budget and a new security minister.

A funny thing about how they worded this. The KCNA didn't say, "Kim Jong-un's name didn't appear on the list." Rather, they simply release the list and say nothing bout Kim Jong-un or any of the other dozens of names. The way the above is worded, it sounds like the KCNA is focusing on KJU as much as South Korea, Japan, and the West are, but in fact they are not.

The BBC also carried the story:

A rare session of North Korea's parliament, seen as an opportunity to reveal more about political succession, has failed to mention leader Kim Jong-il or a son tipped to replace him.

Observers had been looking for clues that the son, Kim Jong-un, would lead a smooth transition as his father ails.

But state media made no mention of either man.

The rubber-stamp Supreme People's Assembly agreed to "remarkably increase" production.

Analysts of North Korea's opaque politics had thought he would be appointed to the National Defence Commission.

However, the official Korean Central News Agency (KCNA) did not mention whether Kim Jong-il or his 28-year-old son attended the session, nor did it include the younger Kim in its mention of appointments.

I have been sounding the horn since last year that the Kim Jong-un ascension is much ado about nothing, and some media outlets have finally come around. But the others are still beholden to that idea, and now that Kim Jong-un didn't get promoted at all apparently, they're scrambling for an excuse or altering their story to save face:

“Not getting elected to a government post doesn’t threaten Kim Jong Un’s status as the next leader,” said Kim Yong Hyun, a professor of North Korean studies at Dongguk University in Seoul. “It just means that Kim Jong Il is confident of his health conditions to remain leader and that he will take the time he needs to raise a successor.”

All right then. What's probably going on is that Kim Jong-il wants his son to be his successor — family dynasty and all — but there's palpable opposition to (a) continuing what is becoming increasingly clear is a failed regime and (b) putting the country in the hands of an inexperienced dictator.

And there may be pounding at the gate soon. The populace itself is seriously disgruntled, first from losing their life savings in the Great Currency Obliteration of 2009, and now from the prospect of immense hunger.

The death of Kim Jong-il is the chance they've been waiting for, methinks, and while they'd like to secure their own comfort and safety, the purges have made it increasingly clear that that's not the way to achieve those goals. Supporting his third soon would be more of the same, or worse.

I shall repeat for those who came late, but what's going on here is that the speculative media in South Korea, the US, Europe, and Japan, seeking to fill a gaping chasm where information should be but isn't, has been talking up the succession of North Korea. In the meantime, they have utterly ignored the real story, which is that China is pushing for North Korea to follow Chinese-style reforms so that North Korea can be integrated into China's Manchurian northeast (and its ports used for Manchurian goods).

UPDATE:
Chris Green at Destination Pyongyang, while apparently co-opting my The Kim Who Wasn't There™ sobriquet for Kim Jong-un, has some insightful thoughts on why Kim Jong-un will may not be able to take his father's path to power.

Once more, with feeling?

It looks like another semi-annual meeting of Pyongyang's rubber-stamp legislature will meet next month. Western media is already speculating that this time will be the time that Kim Jong-un gets promoted to Daddy's Heir:

The younger Kim, thought to be in his late 20s, was made a four-star general and vice-chairman of the Central Military Commission in September, and appeared for the first time alongside his father at official functions.

The next step would be to make him vice-chairman of the National Defence Commission, the country's most powerful organ, led by his father. The post has been held by the current leader's brother-in-law since last year.

I'm skeptical, of course, but Kim Jong-un getting a new title or two would be as clear a sign as any that there are powerful people in place trying to make sure KJU takes the reins of power when Kim Jong-il dies.

But I'm not disputing that. Of course the Dear Leader is trying to solidify his legacy, while others in his inner circle are trying to guarantee their seat on the gravy train. Rather, I simply don't think that giving L'il L'il Kim all these vice titles are any indication of wide acceptance of the dangerously inexperienced Kim Jong-un's ascension. When Daddy's gone, those titles may mean nothing to factions that don't want to see a sequel to Godfather II.

And what about that post held by KJU's uncle (KJI's brother-in-law)? Mr Chang Songtaek's own hold on power is what bolsters nephew Kim Jong-un. As they move things around that to shore up this but expose that, methinks the Kim-Chang alliance will soon realize they can't win this game of Jenga.

Is that Kim Jong-un's older brother Kim Jong-chul in the Jenga advertisement?

Has Kim Jong-un already risen to number two? Or is our media analysis a bunch of number two?

[Note: This post and its companion are a compilation and expansion of two recent comments I left at One Free Korea, slightly expanded upon here.]

On display on the giant display.
Is this a picture highlighting Kim Jong-un, or is this a scene from a video 
congratulating Kim Jong-il on living another year that has been captured as a 
still shot and is presented by the New York Times in such a way 
that it looks like it was the centerpiece of the show?  

Writing at One Free Korea, frequent commenter Glans noted:

Kim Jong-Un is now #2. Anyhow, the NY Times says that Chosun Ilbo says that an anonymous source says so. Read the report by Mark McDonald.

Hmm… I'm still skeptical about The Kim Who Wasn't There. It doesn’t help that the article’s author appears to confuse himself:

South Korean government officials could not immediately confirm Kim Jong-il’s promotion, and KCNA had made no mention of it by Wednesday afternoon. [emphasis mine]

I think he meant Kim Jong-un [this has since been corrected by the NYT]. L'il Kim. I wonder where else Mr McDonald’s confused. This is the NYT, right? You’d think they’d have better editing than that. (Or was this a case of me grossly misreading the article at 1:30 a.m.? There are so many Kim Jong-x running around.)

I’m also skeptical of the claim being made that this promotion means “he has been elevated to North Korea’s #2.” It says he was “named to the post of vice chairman of the defense commission” [emphasis mine], but isn’t there already a vice chairman in the form of his own uncle? Did Jang Songthaek lose that post? If not, then Kim Jong-un is more like #3, not #2.

I’m wondering if this can be a “definitive declaration” when the KCNA doesn’t even carry it (so far). Sorry, but I’m skeptical that the same people who thought for so long that Kim Jong-un was 김정운 and not 김정은 suddenly have such a clearer picture of what’s going on up there.

When we start seeing official portraits and/or badges of Kim Jong-un, that means he’s been anointed.

Did a Chinese official confirm the ascension of Kim Jong-un?

[Note: This post and its companion are a compilation and expansion of two recent comments I left at One Free Korea, slightly expanded upon here.]

Mr Meng and Mr Kim, as presented by Reuters.
Kim Jong-un is in the back with the sycophants.

A couple of recent North Korea-related news items have led a few bloggers and commenters to ask me whether I should rethink my position that Kim Jong-un, Kim Jong-il's son and presumed heir, is little more than "The Kim Who Wasn't There" (see here, here, and most recently here).

First, there is this item at One Free Korea:

“Meng Jianzhu, China’s public security minister, congratulated Kim’s youngest son Jong-un on his appointment as vice-chairman of the Central Military Commission last year, “hailing the successful solution of the issue of succession to the Korean revolution,” KCNA news agency reported. This is followed by some “expert” interpretations of what “succession” means in this context, but I don’t find those interpretations very persuasive.

This comes from a Reuters article entitled, "China openly backs North Korea succession plan: KCNA" (a similar article from Yonhap is here). Joshua himself invites me to address the issue:

Over to you, Kushibo

Hmm... I'd really like to see which KCNA report they're referring to; that is, I'd like to see the actual report. This one (here in Chosŏnŏ) about Mr Maeng meeting Kim Yongnam doesn't really bear out the above interpretation:

Kim Yong Nam, president of the Presidium of the DPRK Supreme People's Assembly, met and had a friendly talk with Meng Jianzhu, minister of Public Security who is state councilor of the People's Republic of China, and his party at the Mansudae Assembly Hall Monday.

Meng said that the Sino-DPRK friendly relations sealed in blood are fraternal and comradely.

He underscored the need to strengthen and develop the Sino-DPRK relations provided by the leaders of the elder generations of the two countries generation after generation.

He noted that his visits to several places during his stay in the DPRK provided an opportunity to know well about the shining achievements made by the Korean people in the building of a thriving socialist nation by displaying the revolutionary fighting spirit and traits.

He expressed belief that under the wise leadership of Kim Jong Il the Korean people would register greater success in the future, too. [emphasis mine]

It would seem Mr Maeng Kŏnju, according to the KCNA, seems to think that Kim Jong-il will be the one leading North Korea 앞으로 (in the future).

But that doesn't matter if the media have an agenda to foist, or at least reputations to preserve (and admitting you don't know what's going on is a good way to tarnish your reputation). From the article Joshua linked:

"(But) we can interpret that as a sign of acceptance on the part of China's political and power elite with regards to North Korea's succession," said Park Young-ho, of the Korea Institute for National Unification in Seoul.

In other words: Mr Maeng says one thing, but we can "interpret" that to mean that other, different thing we've already decided it means. In other other words, "These are not the droids you're looking for."

Thank you, but I'll stick to the manifest content of these dreamy pronouncements. The latent interpretation is just too fuzzy. Particularly when it's coming from people who had no clue that "Kim Jong-un" was 김정은 and not 김정운. I mean, really, are we supposed to place all our faith in the tea leaf-reading of "experts" and journalists who got the guy's name wrong in Korean because they only had access to it in English or Japanese?!

I'll reiterate my position: I do believe that someone is trying to push Kim Jong-un into a position of leadership, perhaps as a figurehead, a puppet, a dupe, a symbol around which to rally the people, a source of stability, whatever, BUT this is by no means the done deal that we are being led to believe it is, as the South Korean, Japanese, and Western media are looking for evidence though which to prove that interpretation, even to the point of misleading us (in the free world) that the North Korean hoi polloi are being pushed to accept it.

Mr Kim and Mr Meng and the other Kim, presented by Fox News.
Look, suddenly the L'il Kim is up in front. But where was he mostly?
Did everyone have a chance to come up front? Did others? Just KJU?
We actually know very little from this picture, but we're tempted to assume a lot.

This father-to-son transfer of power will not likely be pushed onto the hoi polloi until it is on solid ground within the ruling elite, which is a somewhat shaky prospect. It might happen, but it hasn't happened yet. We will know when this has happened because it will be evident in the North Korean media and on regime paraphernalia, like the official portraiture and badges. Such Kim Jong-un hagiography, portraiture, and paraphernalia have not yet materialized, which was a key element of the aforementioned link.

Meanwhile, all this tabloidesque focus on palace intrigue (Kim Jongchol at an Eric Clapton concert, really?!) utterly ignores the real story that is going on, the Manchurianization of North Korea, whereby China is pushing the Pyongyang regime to accept Chinese-style reforms so as to stabilize the country by making it more prosperous and integrating it into Beijing's own plans for what used to be called Manchuria.

Kim Jong-un is not in charge now and possibly never will be. Heck, given the events of the last few years, I'm not entirely sure Kim Jong-il himself is actually in charge, but that's an issue for another day.

UPDATE (an hour later):
Ah, I finally found the KCNA article in question (朝鮮語), but it makes little difference. Here's an excerpt in English:

Kim Jong Il thanked for this and asked Meng to convey his regards to the senior officials of the Chinese party and state including Hu Jintao. He had a cordial and friendly talk with Meng.

Meng warmly congratulated Kim Jong Il upon his reelection as general secretary of the WPK and Kim Jong Un upon his election as vice-chairman of the Central Military Commission of the WPK at the historic Conference of the WPK, hailing the successful solution of the issue of succession to the Korean revolution.

Witnessing the reality of the DPRK, he was deeply impressed by the signal achievements made by the Korean people under the leadership of Kim Jong Il, he said, adding that the Chinese people are rejoiced over as over their own the achievements made by the fraternal Korean people.

Is "the issue of succession to the Korean revolution" supposed to mean "the issue of Kim Jong-un's succession to Korean leadership"? That seems a stretch. Interesting that the Korean-language omits that part.

UPDATE 2 (the following morning):
[Note: this was originally a comment I left at OFK.] Joshua, I don't know that we were actually ever that far apart on it. With the government slots the untested General Kim Jong-un has been given, it's been clear at least since last October that he's being pushed up by someone.

However, what I take issue with is how the media, many experts, and even the government have not only accepted this uncritically, but they have also massaged recent events to fit an interpretation that the ascension is on the fast track. Cumulatively, I feel we are being misled.

The track record is abominable. Kim Jong-il is not dead from pancreatic cancer (remember that one?), he is not immobile from a stroke, and Kim Jong-un is not 김정운. Yet think how confidently these were presented and how uncritically they were accepted.

Kim Jong-il almost certainly had a stroke, and then the collective media (South Korean, Japanese, and Western) fell over themselves trying to report Kim Jong-il to death. Every little sign was an indicator of his imminent demise, and pictures that showed him walking around were deemed to be faux-toshop fakes.

Yet it seems almost no one bothered to open up a medical manual or go to WebMD.com and see what actually happens with a minor stroke. Nothing related to his actual condition should have been surprising, but it turned out to be totally unexpected by a press and public that was sure he'd be dead by the first half of 2010.

Even the article you cited in this post refers to Kim Jong-il as "ailing North Korean leader Kim Jong-il." I won't take too much issue with the word ailing because technically it's true. The guy is probably taking Coumadin cocktails several times a day, but the word ailing suggests he's on a downward trend when in fact he seems to be recovering adequately and normally from the stroke. Indeed, he may be on an upward trend.

The media should stick to reporting what they know and do a better job of separating fact from speculation, while removing their hopeful agenda from the equation. And we should call them on it.

The one where kushibo almost ate his words. Almost.

So the other day I'm going through my list of must-read blogs, and I encounter this piece of news at One Free Korea and at Korea Beat, both referring to this post in NK Daily The Daily NK, about people in North Korea burning official portraits of Kim Jong-il and Kim Jongsuk.

Well, I will admit kushibo did a double-take. I have been highly critical of how easily the South Korean, Japanese, and Western media have accepted the notion that "the succession of Kim Jong Eun... is moving at breakneck speed," and I have pointed out repeatedly that the KCNA is providing the North Korean people with virtually no mention of Kim Jong-un even though the Chosun Ilbo and The Daily NK would have us believe that his stature is being raised so high and so quickly that the besieged North Korean people are reacting adversely to his ascension.

So when I saw the above photo in Korea Beat, I thought I'd finally seen evidence that my working hypothesis is wrong, or at least no longer accurate. Maybe I was still a bit bleary-eyed, but at the time I could have sworn that Korea Beat said the two portraits being burned were Kim Jong-il and Kim Jong-un.

You see, if official portraits and/or badges of Kim Jong-un were distributed for the public to see and wear, that would be a clear, necessary, and even irrefutable sign that the Pyongyang regime has gone ahead with selling the North Korean public on the idea that KJI's son will be their next leader. If that were an official, stylized portrait of Kim Jong-un, then that would mean his rise has been accepted — perhaps irreversibly — by the ruling apparatus and they now are pushing the North Korean people to follow.

But it turned out that the portrait at left in the photo was Kim Jongsuk, the mother of Kim Jong-il and already an established member of the Great Chosŏn pantheon. In other words, not Kim Jong-un. Still no signs of the public deification of Kim Jong-un, despite what the media would have us believe.

[Frankly, I blame a combination of things for my brief oversight: (a) the North Korean portrait makers depicting Kim Jong-il's mom as a bit manly, (b) the portrait defacers giving Kim Jongsuk facial hair, (c) talk of the political significance of Kim Jong-un's otter pelt hat leading me to subconsciously think that Kim Jongsuk's long flowing hair in the back was actually some frilly fur thing worn by Kim Jong-un to keep warm, and (d) the unisex V-neck of the traditional chosŏnbok, which provides no clue of its wearer's gender.]

But wait a minute, kushibo, if the North Korean people aren't being force-fed grandiose claims about Kim Jong-un, what about all that writing? Some of the accompanying handwritten remarks are clearly about Kim Jong-un, so that must mean something, right?

Well, I'm glad you asked that question, curious reader. Apparently, someone in North Korea is aware of Kim Jong-un and all the talk of his rise to power, and that someone has decided it would be appropriate to write notes about this. The question is, who is that person? North Koreans along the border with China may have enough exposure to Chinese news media that they would be clued into non-Chinese media's obsession with Kim Jong-un's ascension, but would that be enough to precipitate the spattering of Kim Jong-un-related stories coming from defectors?

My working hypothesis is that The Daily NK and other organizations that rely on clandestine reporting methods deliberately or (more likely) inadvertently distort defectors' reports of KJU sightings by asking leading or loaded questions whose answers lead to foregone conclusions: "Have you seen any evidence of Kim Jong-un's rise?" might easily yield an affirmative answer to a new defector who may feel obliged to please this new aid-giver. The result would easily be an apparent picture of Kim Jong-un having a higher profile than he actually does (as evidenced by the dearth of Kim Jong-un mentions in North Korea's official news media).

Now don't get me wrong: I'm not bashing The Daily NK and I think they do incredible work, with many on their team risking their lives to get word out of and into North Korea. But that halo doesn't magically preclude what social scientists call experimenter bias, and that makes me somewhat skeptical. After all, the Kim Jong-un drama has attracted a lot of attention to the North Korean issue — and how pathetic is it that it takes palace intrigue and not the ongoing deaths of hundreds of thousands for the foreign media to pay serious attention! — and it might be forgivable for The Daily NK to milk that new focus for what it's worth. As long as they're not lying or knowingly reporting distortions, I don't have too much of a problem with what they're doing, given the big picture.

Now back to the portrait burning. According to The Daily NK, this was done by some peasant, but by a party official:

The North Korean defector who provided the video clip explained, "A Party official from North Hamkyung Province burned the pictures and wrote 'bastard Kim Jong Il’ and ‘Kim Jong Eun is the child of a concubine' on a piece of paper at his house on January 1st this year. The video clip was produced and leaked to display the person’s hostility towards Kim Jong Il and worsening public opinion within North Korea."

The person also wrote a message on the reverse side of the paper, "Kim Jong Il is a bastard, Kim Jong Eun is the son of concubine. Not once did he talk about being married, and now he is facing death he is suddenly looking for his son? We cannot accept this.”

Bear in mind that this is all according to the defector who brought the tape, a tape which The Daily NK has chosen not to show. Now, if it's legitimate, protecting the identity of the official who burned the portraits is sound, but there's always something inherently risky in taking someone else's word for something without evidence. The Daily NK suggests that the official portraits could only be in the hands of a party official, though I'm skeptical of that claim as well (is there no theft in North Korea?).

So at this point I see two major possibilities of who is behind the portrait burning. One is that it really is a North Korean party official way up in North Hamgyŏng Province, and he or she somehow got this tape of this brazen act to a defector who got it to The Daily NK. Getting the word out that there are disgruntled party officials could be useful information. And it certainly would be something I predicted could come out of the Great Currency Obliteration of 2009:

Unless there have been behind-the-scenes provisions for connected people to exchange considerably more than the $40 or $60 limit, then those middle-level party cadres who run the show outside of Pyongyang suddenly have a lot less stake in keeping the regime going.

The other major possibility is that this is all the work of defectors, who have gotten wise that South Korean, Western, and Japanese media are eager for "news" of Kim Jong-un's prominence in North Korea, to the point that such defectors are staging such things for their benefit. Now this does not mean the whole story is pointless or useless. Nowadays these things have a way of filtering back to North Koreans themselves, and even if this was staged by a ballsy defector (in or near North Korea), it might have a psychological effect on those North Koreans who later hear about it or see the pictures.

Interesting times, though I still believe Kim Jong-un is The Kim Who Wasn't There™. Maybe this week I should redo the KCNA experiment to see how much the Brilliant Comrade is actually mentioned, since I haven't done that in over a month. Who knows, maybe things have changed... and I would be the first to admit it.

North Korea triples public executions since Great Currency Obliteration

In late 2009, I predicted that the revaluation of the North Korean currency (they lopped off the last two zeroes) and especially the restriction on how much could be converted to the new money (a move meant to curb the underground markets that effectively wiped out the life savings of millions of people) could lead to enough disgruntlement that we would witness a sea change in how North Koreans see the Pyongyang regime.

In short, many would clearly see that, an endless loop of propaganda notwithstanding, the government was not on their side. Moreover, the resulting decimation of the markets would mean that for millions of people outside Pyongyang and the spheres of power, it would be far harder for them to secure the sustenance needed for survival. And that means that at some point in their grim calculus of how to respond to the regime, what I referred to as "the tipping point of death," doing nothing would become a deadlier option than doing something. This sea change in attitudes, I believe, will turn out to be a key factor in the eventual collapse of the DPRK.

Sadly, news today suggests that North Korean authorities, who were blindsided by the ensuing wrath of the people and sometimes violent public displays of anger that occurred in the wake of them wiping out the life savings of the citizenry, may have recognized the very thing I was talking about. Specifically, The Japan Times is reporting a tripling of public executions since the currency revaluation:

Public executions have more than tripled in North Korea since the dictatorship in late 2009 redenominated its currency and in the process sparked widespread public discontent, according to a recent report seen by The Japan Times.

According to the confidential South Korean government report obtained by Lee Young Hwa, an economics professor at Kansai University, 52 North Koreans were publicly executed between December 2009 and last November, compared with 16 reported executions between January and November 2009.

We were already aware that the supposed architects of the currency revaluation were executed, but the other public executions were also meant to quash any attempts by the populace to rise up about this life-or-death issue:

The report said the surge in executions was a direct result of the redenomination and was aimed at instilling fear to dampen increasing public discontent aimed at the dictatorship.

"The number of public executions began increasing in 2009, when the succession of power from Kim Jong Il to his son and heir apparent, Kim Jong Un, became full-fledged," said Lee, a North Korea expert who also heads the organization Rescue the North Korean Refugees — Urgent Action Network (RENK).

"The report is a warning that North Korea's iron-fisted reign of terror will harden under Kim Jong Un," he said.

Crime categories that could be subject to the death penalty were increased from five to 21 in March 2008, and further categories were included following the redenomination, including "execution for illegal circulation of foreign currency," and "death by shooting for leaking information via cell phones," the report said.

I, of course, don't really buy the facile conclusion that all this is being orchestrated by or for Kim Jong-il's son Kim Jong-un, aka The Kim Who Wasn't There, but I do agree with the report on the purpose of these executions. The JT article also notes that Christians and others expressing opposition to the regime have also been executed.

And while one might see this as signs of a dark time that is getting bleaker, I hold out hope that the DPRK authorities seeing a need to do this is a direct result of the population's anger toward the regime starting to reach a boiling point. As usually, I'm cautiously (and pragmatically) optimistic.

A charter paving the way for Kim Jong-un?

Anyone who visits my blog knows that I am highly skeptical of how much of a done-deal the ascension of Kim Jong-un is, despite the South Korean, Japanese, and Western media's general acceptance of it as future fact. (And just so we're clear, I think the real story is the one they're missing: the Manchurianization of North Korea).

But as contrarian as I am, I am also honest, and if I see something that contradicts my viewpoint, I am happy, even to the point of ecstatic, to review it. So when Voice of America says they have in their hot little hands the charter that maps out Kim Jong-un's rise to the top of the heap, I sit up and take notice:

North Korea has revised the charter of its only political party, apparently to ensure a smooth transition of power from father to son in the reclusive communist state. VOA correspondent Steve Herman has obtained a copy of the document, which has not been made public in or outside North Korea.

North Korea experts say the revised Korea Workers Party charter (PDF), obtained by VOA, appears to create the framework for ruler Kim Jong Il to be succeeded by his son, Kim Jong Un.

The charter revision is dated September 28th last year, which was when party representatives met in Pyongyang. The following day the state-run news agency announced the charter had been revised to strengthen the party’s leadership and enhance its role in the army.

But specifics were not revealed, nor has the new charter been publicly issued.
Specialists on North Korea, including some in the intelligence community, who have seen the copy of the revised charter, say they have no reason to doubt its authenticity.

Government officials and academic analysts in Seoul say one of the changes to the charter allows the head of the party to also run the Central Military Commission, ensuring that one person is able to control all military and state affairs. Kim Jong Un, who is in his late 20’s, co-chairs the commission along with 68-year-old Army Chief of Staff, Vice Marshall Ri Yong Ho.

Cheong Seong-chang is a senior fellow at the Sejong Institute, which studies South Korean defense and foreign affairs policy. He says the change means Kim Jong Un will have full authority to control the military and the country should his father suddenly die.

For those of you who read Korean (and full disclosure: it would take me an entire afternoon to slog through this document), the PDF is right here. I'll see if I can get my Kindle to read it.

Now the obvious questions are: What does this mean? Is it the real deal? If it is real, has anything changed since it was issued? Has it ever been implemented or was it merely a draft? Who knows about it? Is it possible this "unreleased" document was leaked so that the North Korean security apparatus, ahem, could see where they need to plug things up?

In my theory whereby the Young General is the Kim Who Wasn't There, there is still room for Kim Jong-il to try to get his son to succeed him, and this may genuinely be a document meant to do that. But then we have to ask ourselves: Is he really in a position at this point to ram that through?

Finally, I leave you with this. Go to the KCNA site and look at the dates for the news (English here, Korean here). Go on, I'll wait. I've got last week's Community in my Hulu queue and I'm willing to wait. Okay, do you notice anything different from the official North Korean news site and the supposed North Korean super secret government charter document?

That's right, kiddies, the VOA document is missing the Juche date (주체 100년), while the English and Korean news sites include both the Gregorian calendar date (2011년) and the Juche date. That's quite an oversight on the part of whomever is trying to ensure that Fat Boy's Kin is going to rise like cream to the top.

But what do I know? I still think Kim Jong-il might be around until at least the middle of this decade.

Happy birthday, Mr Future General-Secretary

Below is the video that hackers posted to the official North Korean YouTube site (HT to nkeconwatch, whose YouTube feed I snagged it from):



It was "in honor" of Kim Jong-un's birthday, and it makes reference to the derailment of the train carrying gifts for the Kim Who Wasn't There.

Frankly, though I'm certainly no fan of the Kim Dynasty, I'm a bit loath to make start depicting a guy who is only twenty-eight and has yet to take power as a sociopathic killer. Not that that stops me from making fun of the guy.

Is the mainstream media finally coming around on "The Kim Who Wasn't There"?

[originally posted here and here]

As someone who has long insisted (please read link first) that the ascension of Kim Jong-un, the son of Dear Leader Kim Jong-il, is not the done deal that it has been made out to be in the press, I am tickled that the Washington Post and the New York Times are finally recognizing that they may have collectively jumped the gun. From the NYT:

When he was introduced to the public in September, Kim Jong-un appeared destined to succeed his father, Kim Jong-il, as the leader of the irascible, destitute and nuclear-armed nation. But a growing number of experts in Seoul are beginning to question whether he has been fully certified, despite his elevation to high military rank and the urgency created by his father’s poor health.

“There are some minor but real reasons to ask if we are rushing our judgment about Kim Jong-un,” said Andrei Lankov, a professor and North Korea expert at Kookmin University in Seoul.

“The regime seems to be making preparations for the succession, but they haven’t reached the point of no return,” Mr. Lankov said. “Next year, they could very well say, ‘Kim Jong- un? Oh, he’s just one of 20 other generals.’”

Certainly, the Kim family has worked hard to make the succession appear inevitable. Despite having had no field experience in the military, the youngman was made a four-star general Sept. 28. His father also gave him two powerful posts in the ruling Workers’ Party.

Father and son appeared together the following week, reviewing a military parade in Pyongyang. The parade was shown live by several foreign broadcasters, a first for the notoriously secretive nation.

What the cameras showed was a rotund young man with an uncanny physical resemblance to his grandfather, Kim Il-sung, the founder of North Korea. Jowls, smile, posture, tunic, haircut — all nearly identical, right down to the dainty and perfunctory way he clapped his hands.

But that is where the learning curve ended, and experts have been confounded by the younger Mr. Kim’s low profile in the ensuing months. Interviews with scholars, analysts, diplomats and recent refugees suggest that Mr. Kim, much like his country, largely remains a riddle. “We know more about distant galaxies than we do about North Korea,” a Western diplomat said privately.

A hundred days after his elevation, the regime’s powerful mythmaking apparatus has hardly mentioned the heir apparent, to the surprise of most North Korea watchers. Ordinary citizens seemingly know little about him, and his personal biography still contains the same large, unexplained gaps it has since he was first mentioned as a potential successor: he studied as a teenager in Switzerland, or so it seems; he speaks several languages, or maybe just the one; he’s married, or perhaps he’s single; he dearly loves his oldest brother, or has plotted with Chinese agents to have him killed.

To the surprise of many North Korea watchers? Well, not this one! I've been saying as much for four months.

And not Barbara Demick, who bravely admits she doesn't know what's going on (no one does), and who suggests that last fall's "coming out party" for Kim Jong-un to which the Western media was invited (which was actually a reaffirmation that Kim Jong-il is in charge) just means that "he's daddy's favorite."

I've been saying since September that the North Korean media reports (i.e., KCNA) do not match the picture being painted by the Western media — which is scrambling to report something on this guy they know nothing about and thus easily falls into the trap of reporting each other's speculations as factualistic and truthy — and by groups of brave North Korean defectors and rogue on-the-ground "journalists" (NOTE: I had inadvertently omitted that word when I first posted this) which inadvertently satiate a hungry know-nothing South Korean, Japanese, and Western media with stories they want to believe.

(Nor do the facts on the ground support a Kim Jong-un ascension. Kim Jong-il is still "healthy" — Western speculative reports of his imminent demise notwithstanding — and has been for some time, even though the Western media thought they could report him almost-dead to death. Meanwhile, the big story that's probably really happening is being largely ignored: that Beijing is pressuring Pyongyang to adopt economic reforms being followed in Northeast China that could alter the nature of the country and integrate the DPRK with neighboring Chinese provinces and make North Korea more palatable to the PRC leadership, what I am calling the Manchurianization of North Korea.)

If Kim Jong-un is to be made a leader that the North Korean people are expected to follow, the case will be made in the hagiographic pages of the official mouthpieces: the KCNA and the Rodong Shinmun. If he's not being deified there, then any claims that he has already been anointed should be questioned.

Anyway, I'm glad the NYT seems to be getting it now (and only several months later). I was also a little tickled by this sentence regarding the mystery surrounding Kim Jong-un's age:

It is still unclear whether he turned 28 or 29 on his birthday this Saturday.

Ha ha! Welcome to Korean age.

An official portrait of Kim Jong-un?

Mark MacKinnon of The Globe and Mail of Canada suggests this untitled portraint spotted in a Rajin museum by a Canadian tourist might be just that, in which it case it is a sign of the Kim Jong-un cult gaining traction. That we're seeing a Kim Jong-un portrait seems to be supported by a few notable names in the North Korea Watching industry. [HT to OFK commenter jason bastrop]:

If it is him, and a majority of the experts consulted by The Globe and Mail believe that it is, the portrait marks the first glimpse anyone outside North Korea has had of how the regime will sell Kim Jong-un to a people conditioned to believe his father is their infallible Dear Leader and his grandfather, Kim Il-sung, an immortal who remains president despite his death in 1994.

It would be laughable, perhaps, if the new propaganda campaign weren’t accompanied by new military recklessness – including last month’s deadly shelling of a South Korean island – intended to give Kim Jong-un, already praised as “the Young General,” victories to claim as his own. [Kushibo's note: I again emphasize my skepticism that there is much "praise" being put on Kim Jong-un at all]

Out of half a dozen North Korea scholars who were sent a copy of the portrait, only one disagreed that the subject was likely Kim Jong-un. The other experts saw it as the launch of a massive propaganda campaign that will attempt to portray the heir apparent as having been sent abroad to learn foreign ways and technologies, while always keeping North Korea and its people in his heart.

Several who saw the portrait noted the physical resemblance (though the heir apparent is much flabbier in recent television footage), as well as a background that looks to be Interlaken, Switzerland, where Kim Jong-un is known to have spent time while studying at the International School of Berne in the late 1990s.

“It’s big news,” said Brian Myers, an expert on North Korea at Dongseo University in South Korea. “It’s hard to be completely certain on the basis of an untitled image alone. … But I cannot imagine a schoolboy outside the Kim family meriting this kind of painting, and it is very similar in mood and layout to depictions of the young Kim Il-sung and the young Kim Jong-il. So I would assume that it is Kim Jong-un although it is not a particularly striking likeness in view of the Kim Jong-un we have seen photographed in the past few months.”

Me? I don't think so (and I see I'm in good company with the likes of Professor Andrei Lankov, the one holdout whom The Globe and Mail interviewed).

And I think folks like Brian Myers — if he really was just shy of "completely certain" and that's not Mr MacKinnon putting enthusiasm in his mouth — ought to rethink where they're sitting on this bandwagon, lest their reputation be sullied by a major fail (and let's face it, Brian Myers has only one set of lenses when it comes to interpreting what's going on in North Korea, one I find wanting when it comes to explaining or predicting a lot of what goes on up there, so there's not a lot of margin for error... sometimes it seems you're only as good as your last success in this business).

In fact, I think that, like so much other "news" about Kim Jong-un's rise to power (read: unsupported speculation and journalistic pipe-dreaming), I think this is uninformed conjecture to fill a void of real information. The kind of void where a Canadian tourist visiting a museum in North Korea probably with display markers in a language he/she doesn't understand can set tongues wagging.

The style of school uniform, especially the hat, is reminiscent of the Japanese colonial era in which Kim Ilsung grew up (the Japanese annexed Korea in 1910 and he was born two years later). And while I have no idea what churches look like in Switzerland, the style of the church in the background here is quite similar to small-foundation brick-and-mortar Christian houses of worship in Korea (both Protestant and Catholic). Pyongyang was, before the Communists took over, known as "the Jerusalem of the East," and Kim Ilsung's own grandfather was a Presbyterian minister and his father a church elder.

The stone work and the railing along the river walk is also found in Korea. And the upward flare of the eaves (is that the right word?) on the house in the background appear more Korean than Swiss.

And think about it: When North Korea has not even acknowledged that Kim Jong-un was educated in the West, why would they glorify it in a painting?

I'll bet if I had a little more time I could find an authorized North Korean portrait of Kim Ilsung as a student dressed not unlike that. In the meantime, note the facial similarity with the Kim Ilsung (checking the door) below.